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Abstract
By the year 2030 there will be twice as many retirees in the United States
as today but only 18 percent more workers. This aging of the population will
place considerable nancial strain on the United States social security system;
relatively few workers will be taxes to pay the benets of relatively many retirees.
Because of this change in demographics, the Social Security Administration will
not be able to pay scheduled social security benets as outlined by current law.
Therefore, it is imperative that the government act soon to address the looming
scal imbalance of the social security program.
The Senate Aging Committee and the Government Accountability O¢ ce
(GAO) both encourage Congress to take a Rawlsian perspective when evaluating
social security reform measures that are intended to cope with changing demo-
graphics. In their estimation, a desirable reform should not only balance the
budget, but it should also protect benets for the economically vulnerable.
In this paper, I examine the relationship between John Rawlstheory of so-
cial justice and the US social security system. I then provide fteen possible
social security reforms that are consistent with Rawlstheory. I conclude with an
analysis of the political feasibility of the various reforms considered. As a special
example, the mathematical model used to generate the results for three of the
reforms is included at the end of the paper.
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CHAPTER 1.
INTRODUCTION
The United States social security system is one of the largest social insurance pro-
grams in the world. Created during the Great Depression, social security has provided
a safety net for elderly Americans and disabled workers for over 75 years. Currently,
53 million people receive social security benets; over two-thirds of the recipients are
retired workers and their dependents. "Social insurance programs play a major role
in redistributing income; in maintaining the quality of life for the old, sick, disabled,
and unemployed; and arguably in the United States [social security] does more di-
rectly to reduce poverty and inequality than any other government program, including
all welfare programs combined and the various targeted deductions of the Federal tax
code" (Paden, 1998, p.179).
In 2010, The Senate Special Committee on Aging reported, "44 percent of older
Americans would be considered poor by federal standards if they did not receive Social
Security benets, and for the majority of retired Americans, Social Security serves as
their primary source of income" (foreword p.v). "Social security is the main source of
income for most retirees, providing over 80 percent of the cash income available to at
least half of all elderly individuals and couples" (Burtless, 1997, p. 407). Robert M. Ball,
while serving as the Social Security commissioner, proudly declared, social security is
"Americas most successful and deservedly most popular social program. . .No other
program so clearly makes the Unites States a better and safer place" (as quoted by
Gokhale, 2010, p.167).
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Social security started out a relatively modest program that was funded with a
2 percent payroll tax. Congress has increased the generosity of the program by adding
new benets and indexing benets to the consumer price index. Payroll taxes were
increased to nance these changes. The size of social security, as a percentage of GDP,
has increased from around 2 percent in 1962 to 4.8 percent in 2009. The program is
expected to grow to 6.1 percent of GDP in 2035 and 6.3 percent by 2080 (Congressional
Budget O¢ ce (CBO), 2009).
Taxes. Social Security in the US is an unfunded, or pay-as-you-go (PAYGO)
system. Current workers are taxed to pay benets to current retirees. The retirement
portion of social security (the Old Age and Survivors Insurance or OASI) is nanced
with a 10.6 percent payroll tax that is split evenly between workers and employers. This
tax is levied on all earnings up to an ination adjusted maximum amount, often referred
to as the "tax cap." In 2010, earnings were taxed up to $106,800. Taxable earnings
represent only 83 percent of total covered earnings (all earnings for employment covered
by social security) (CBO, 2010)1.
Benets. In general, workers are eligible to receive full social security benets
when they reach 66 years of age and have paid social security taxes for at least 10
1The contribution base increases at the rate of increase in the national wage index only if the Cost
of Living Adjustment (COLA) is positive. The COLA is legally calculated from the percentage change
in the CPI. Therefore, the following scenario could be plausible:
1.) Wage growth exceeds growth in prices.
2.) Prices dont grow at all meaning that the percentage change in the CPI (the ination rate)
equals zero, yet there is still a positive percentage change in the national wage index since wage
growth exceeds price growth.
3.) No COLA results since the percentage change in the CPI equals zero.
4.) Therefore, no increase in the contribution base (tax cap) despite the fact that there was a
positive percentage change in the national wage index (Social Security Act, 1983, Sec. 230, United
States Senate, 2009, p.2).
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years.2 Workers may choose to retire early and claim a reduced benet starting at age
62. Initial benets are based on average lifetime earnings, and increase over time to
keep up with the cost of living. A formula, called a benet-earning rule, is used to
translate average earnings into benets. The US benet-earning rule is both increasing
(benets increase as wage income increases) and concave (each additional dollar of
wage income generates a smaller increase in benets). The benet-earning rule is a
piecewise linear function with three segments. The threshold at which the slope of the
benet-earning rule changes is called a bend point. The current US benet-earning
rule calculates benets as 90 percent of average monthly wage earnings up to the rst
bend point, plus 32 percent of earnings between the rst and second bend points, plus
15 percent of earnings between the second bend point and the tax cap. The bend
points, like the tax cap, are indexed to wage growth, as calculated by an index created
by the Social Security Administration (SSA).3 The current bend points are $761, and
$4,586 (which correspond to $9,132 and $55,032 annually). The bend points occur at
approximately the same place in the distribution of earnings each year. The rst bend
point corresponds to the 11th percentile of earnings; the second bend point corresponds
to the 71st percentile. The SSA estimates a worker who had average annual earnings
who retires at age 65 in 2010 will receive an annual benet of $16,500. This amount
would replace about 40 percent of her earnings before retirement (CBO, 2010). (See
gure 6 for an illustration of the benet-earning rule).
2An increase in the retirement age from 65 to 67, phased in over a two-decade period beginning in
2002 was scheduled as a result of the social security amendments passed in 1983. Thus, the current
full retirement age is 66.
3For an explanation of the wage index used, see <http://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/AWI.html>
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Budget. The nancing of an unfunded social security system can be represented
with the simple equation0BB@ social security
tax rate
1CCA
0BB@ average wage
per worker
1CCA
0BB@ number of
workers
1CCA=
0BB@ average benets
per retiree
1CCA
0BB@ number of
retirees
1CCA :
If this simple equation holds at a given point in time, then aggregate taxes paid (left-
hand side of the equation) will equal aggregate benets received (right-hand side of the
equation). Rearranging the equation gives
average benets
per retiree
=
0BB@ social security
tax rate
1CCA
0BB@ average wage
per worker
1CCA
0BB@ ratio of workers
to retirees
1CCA :
From this equation it is easy to see that benets rely directly on the ratio of
workers to retirees. On average in the US during the period 2000-2010, the ratio of
workers to retirees was approximately 3.3. That number is predicted to fall to 2.0 over
the next few decades. (See Figure 1.) The SSA lists three main reasons for this decline:
the aging of the baby-boom generation, continuing low fertility rates, and increasing
life expectancy (Trustees Report, 2010). The Chief Actuary of the SSA, Stephen Goss
explains that the majority of drop in the ratio of workers to retirees is due to declining
fertility rates.
Had the total fertility rate stayed at 3 or higher, the current 12.4 percent
payroll tax rate would be adequate to nance currently scheduled benets
and we would not be discussing future shortfalls. But due to the shift in
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birth rates over 30 years ago, we will see the ratio of workers to beneciaries
drop to 2.2 by 2030 and 2.0 by 2040. It is this shift that makes the current
law 12.4 percent tax rate insu¢ cient to fully nance the currently scheduled
benets in the long run. (2005, p.1)
Given this decline in workers relative to retirees, "the cost of Social Security
will generally increase faster than the programs income" (Trustees Report, 2010, p.
20). Data from the CBO emphasize the growing cost of benets given the changing
demographics. They explain that between now and 2035, the number of people over
the age of 65 will increase by 90 percent, while the percentage of people between ages
20 and 64 will only increase at a rate slightly above 10 percent. By 2035 about 93
million people will collect social security benets compared to the 53 million today.
Trust fund. The looming demographic crisis is not a surprise. Demographers
predicted the aging of the population decades ago. In an attempt to "partially prefund"
the increase in costs, the 1983 social security amendments increased payroll taxes, levied
taxes on social security benets of high income earners (these taxes are used to nance
social security) and slowly increased the age of retirement.4 These changes allowed the
program to run a surplus every year from 1983 to 2009. The surplus revenues have been
used to buy non-marketable Treasury securities. The collective value of these securities,
4Although the taxes on social security benets initially targeted "high income earners" the thresh-
olds established for these taxes are not ination-indexed. Therefore, every year there is a positive
increase in prices (and social security benet payments), a greater fraction of benet recipients pay
taxes on benets. Social security benets are taxed at the federal income tax rate on up to 50
percent of social security benets for individuals with a "combined income" between $25,000 and
$34,000 per year. Individuals with a combined income that exceeds $34,000 per year pay income
tax on up to 85 percent of their social security benets. "Combined income" is dened by the
SSA as adjusted gross income plus nontaxable interest plus one half of social security benets. See
<http://www.ssa.gov/planners/taxes.htm> for more details.
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called the trust fund, is $2.2 trillion (Gokhale, 2010). 2010 marks the rst year that
social security did not run a budget surplus. The government predicts that as the
economy recovers from the recession that social security tax revenues will once again
exceed expenditures, but only until the year 2016. From that date forward, the SSA
will need to dip into the trust fund in order to continue paying scheduled benets. The
trust fund will be exhausted by the year 2039 (CBO, 2010, see also Trustees Report,
2010). Figure 2 depicts social security outlays, revenues, and the size of the trust fund.
It is clear from the graph that revenues fall below taxes starting in the year 2016. The
di¤erence between revenues and benets is nanced by the trust fund until 2039 when
the fund becomes depleted.
While the idea of the trust fund seems straight forwardextra tax revenue has
been "saved" for the aging populationin practice, the trust fund is highly contested.
Economists agree that the SSA purchased non-marketable securities with the annual
social security surpluses. Economists also agree that the Treasury will certainly redeem
these securities. Economists, do not agree, however, if the government will be able to
do this without raising taxes, increasing government borrowing, or reducing some form
of government spending. If the government is forced to borrow or increase taxes in
order to redeem the Treasury securities, the result is identical to a counterfactual world
in which the SSA does not have a trust fund at all, and the government is forced to
borrow or increase taxes to pay benets after 2016. In many regards, the two scenarios
are interchangeable. In each scenario, the government is reduced to borrowing more,
taxing more, or spending less in order to nance social security after the year 2016.
Kent Smetters explained, "The inter-related issues of whether the [$2.2] trillion trust
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fund is worth anythingand whether the important date for public policy purposes
is the cost-revenue crossover date (2016) or the trust fund exhaustion date (2039) has
been a source of considerable debate for many years" (2004, p. 1). President Bushs
Commission to Strengthen Social Security released an Interim Report in 2001 that
stated, "assets in the trust fund failed to increase national saving and so could not
count toward pre-funding of future benets" (Smetters, 2004, p. 1).
For the purposes of this paper, I will not give a detailed account of the trust
fund debate. (See Smetters (2004) for an interesting discussion.) It is su¢ cient to
note that if the trust fund increased national savings, then the fund is (likely) a viable
economic asset the government can redeem to pay benets. If the fund has failed to
increase national savings, then it will (likely) be costly for the government to redeem
the treasury bonds. If the Treasury has lent the money to Congress, it will not be
able to give the money back to the SSA without raising taxes or cutting benets.
In a best-case scenario, the trust fund will be redeemed and benets will not need
to be cut or taxes will not need to raised until 2039. In a worst-case scenario, the
government will be forced to cut spending or raise taxes in 2016. In either case, the
future benets as promised by current law, will not be payable given current taxes in
the long run.5 Therefore, the existence (or non-existence) of the trust fund does not
change the fundamental, underlying demographic stresses on the social security system.
The trust fund can only delay the day of reckoning.
Possible solutions. The SSA and the Senate Aging Committee use the phrase
5This is, of course, assuming that the population, wages, and prices all change in a predictable
manner. Under extreme, unforeseen conditions, the analysis o¤ered in these two sentences may prove
inaccurate.
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"scal solvency" or simply the word "solvency" to describe the ability of the SSA to
pay (expected) benets as currently promised by law with (expected) tax revenue. For
the purposes of this paper, I will use "solvency" to denote this ability to pay scheduled
benets using scheduled revenues. Therefore, in order to maintain long term scal
solvency given changing demographics, taxes will need to be raised, benets will need
to be decreased, or some combination of both. The SSA estimates that an immediate
tax rate increase of 1.84 percentage points, a 12.0 percent reduction in benets, or
a general revenue transfer of $5.4 trillion could restore solvency for 75 years. They
note, "Signicantly larger changes would be required to maintain solvency beyond 75
years" (p.2). These estimates seem overly rosy.6 Gokhale denitively states, "social
securitys nancial condition is signicantly worse compared to o¢ cial projections by
the programs trustees" (2010, p.5). The mainstream economic literature estimates it
would take roughly a 5-percentage point tax increase, or a 20-33 percent reduction in
benets to restore solvency (See Feldstein and Liebman (2002)). The Senate Aging
Committee notes that the costs of raising taxes or reducing benets do not a¤ect
all segments of the population evenly. "E¤orts to improve solvency may enhance,
weaken, or have no impact on Social Securitys current level of e¤ectiveness in providing
retirement security for all Americans. Improving the adequacy of benets for vulnerable
populations may also have a cost to implement" (p.70).
Reform Goals. The Senate Aging Committee and the Government Account-
ability O¢ ce (GAO) both encourage Congress to consider two goals when evaluating
6See Kotliko¤ and Burns (2005) Chapter 2 for a discussion of the politics of o¢ cial government
projections.
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Social Security reform measures. In their estimation, a desirable reform (i) balances
the budget, and (ii) protects benets for the economically vulnerable. The Committee
advises, "Congress should enact modest changes to Social Security in the near future
in order to bring its long-term nancing into balance and improve benets for those
who need them most" (from website). The GAO uses similar language in the following
statement, "Thus, the nation faces the challenge of improving long-term program sol-
vency, while also ensuring benet adequacy for economically vulnerable beneciaries"
(from electronic summary). The GAO identies low-income earners, single women, and
people over 80 years of age as the economically vulnerable. They note that many bene-
ciaries fall into more than one of these group; therefore, an e¤ort to protect low-wage
earners may also protect single women and the aged. "The impact of benet reductions
made to restore solvency of the Social Security program could be felt acutely by these
[vulnerable] beneciaries" (GAO, 2009, p.3).
I will begin my discussion of social security reform with a careful look at Rawls
theory of social justice (Chapter 2). Then, I will move on to discuss three types of
Rawlsian social security reforms (Chapter 3). I will begin with reforms that increase
taxes, move to reforms that increase benets, and nally discuss reforms that decrease
benets for the wealthy. As a special example, I will include a mathematical analysis of
changes to the benet-earning rule that can compensate for the demographic shock in
a Rawlsian fashion (Chapter 4). After I have presented these Rawlsian reforms, I will
discuss the political feasibility of Ralwsian social security reforms (Chapter 5). The
mathematical methods used in Chapter 4 are developed more fully in Appendix A.
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CHAPTER 2.
RAWLS: SOCIAL SECURITY AND SOCIAL SECURITY
The desire to protect the most economically vulnerable is consistent with the
political philosophy of John Rawls. In his famous 1971 book, A Theory of Justice,
Rawls argued that a just society would provide a "social minimum" to all members
of society. Although Rawls does not explicitly mention a social insurance program in
his writings, it is possible to use his logic to justify the existence of a social security
program. George Mason philosophy professor Roger Paden believes Rawlstheory can
be applied not only to social security broadly, but also to social security reforms that
respond to the demographic shock. He explains, "If Rawlstheory is to be applied to
the question of Social Security reform, it must be done in at least two stages: First an
ideal theory of social insurance must be outlined; Second, that theory must be applied
to the current, only partially just, situation" (1998, p.183). Paden develops an "ideal
theory" for social security and shows that the current US system is largely justied by
Rawlsian thought.
Before I continue, it is useful to draw a distinction between social welfare pro-
grams, which Rawls clearly supports, and social insurance programs, such as social
security, that I will argue Rawls would also support. A social welfare program is a
publicly administered program that distributes benets cash payments, health care,
or food based strictly on need. Benets are not given to all members of society; only
those who pass a means test that is, only to those who are su¢ ciently poor as dened
by the social planner. By providing for the most needy, social welfare programs provide
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insurance against destitute poverty. The welfare program is funded through some form
of mandatory contribution, such as an income tax. A social insurance program, on the
other hand, is a publicly administered program that distributes benets usually cash
payments to members of society that reach a certain age or experience a (specied)
disability. Thus, with the exception of those who die young, all members of society
may receive social insurance benets. (This is not entirely true of the US social se-
curity system that requires recipients to work for a specied number of years before
qualifying for benets). Social insurance provides for both the poor and the wealthy
in old age and in times of need. By providing for the wealthy as well as the poor, so-
cial insurance programs e¤ectively insure all workers against the risk of outliving their
assets or becoming prematurely disabled. The social insurance program is also funded
through mandatory contributions.
Paden (1998) o¤ers a concise explanation of Rawlsjustication for social welfare
and social insurance programs.
It is clear that, in Rawlstheory, a social insurance program or a social
welfare program would count as just only if it followed from the di¤erence
principle, which is according to Rawls, the principle that the risk-averse
parties to the "original position" would select to govern the economic insti-
tutions of a just society (TJ, pp. 152-156). This principle requires that
subject to several constraints at any particular stage of development, the
economic institutions of an ideally just society must be arranged so as to
maximize the social and economic position of the least advantaged represen-
tative person (TJ, p. 33). As a consequence, when evaluating the relative
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justice of competing economic schemes, the di¤erence principle requires one
to attend only to the relative position of the least advantages representa-
tive person under those schemes, "as specied by [an index] of income and
wealth" (TJ, p. 97, see also pp. 93-100). (p.183)
A social insurance program is desirable, therefore, if it increases the well being of
the poorest members of society. Rawls cautions against dening the poor as a specic
sociological group, such as unskilled workers, and instead suggests it best to dene
poverty in terms of an index of income and wealth, such as "all persons with less than
half of the median income and wealth (TJ, p. 98)" (as quoted by Paden, 1998, p.184).
Rawls explains that during the "legislative phase" risk-averse individuals would nd
it practical to insure against falling into certain economic contingencies.To achieve
this, they would establish what he calls a "transfer branch" that would maintain a
social minimum for all by redistributing wealth from the rich to the poor. A social
welfare program that targets benets to those that fall below a specied fraction of the
median wage, could be part of this transfer branch. A social insurance program that
distributes progressive benets may also meet these criteria by giving low wage earners
proportionally higher benets. If the social welfare program is generous enough, it is
likely a Rawlsian society may have no need for a social insurance program. This may
be, in part, why Rawls failed to directly mention social insurance. (For a discussion of
other reasons, see Paden, 1998).
However, in addition to insuring against poverty, Rawls explains that individ-
uals "will not enter into agreements they know they cannot keep, or can keep only
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with great di¢ culty (TJ, p. 145)" (As quoted by Paden, 1998, p.90). Rawls explains
individuals will also consider the "strains of commitment" in their decisions. Therefore,
although risk-averse individuals may favor a generous welfare program (during the leg-
islative phase), they may also realize it will take considerable strain to maintain that
commitment if they become extremely wealthy. Thus, they may rationally favor a less
redistributive program. Rawls did not directly address this in his book; the philosopher
Nozick detailed this seeming contradiction. Paden explains,
While the least well o¤ may nd it easy to live in a Rawlsian society,
naturally talented individuals might nd it very di¢ cult. Such individuals,
Nozick argues, would believe themselves to be unfairly "used" for the benet
of the least well-o¤, and would object to having their property redistributed
to the least advantaged. As a result, Nozick claims, these more talented
individuals would nd it di¢ cult to maintain their commitment to a society
whose institutions are informed by the di¤erence principle. (p.190)
Paden elaborates, that because the Rawlsian "social minimum" is high, it will act
to some degree as a disincentive to work. Some of the poor, perhaps those individuals
that place large value on leisure, may choose to live o¤ the generous social benets
instead of working. Under these circumstances, society may not appear just to (some of)
the wealthy that work while others reap benets. Society may fail "to be a cooperative
venture for mutual benet (TJ, 4), because some of the poor would be beneting,
but not cooperating" (Paden, 1998, p.191). Under these pressures, society may opt
for (what Rawls would see as) less than desirable levels of welfare. Paden suggests a
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solution. "One of the best ways to reduce the strains brought about by the transfer
branch while maintaining justice in the system, I would argue, would be to adopt a
social insurance program to supplement the required social welfare program" (1998,
p.191). Social insurance is desirable, therefore, because it meets the "commitment
strains" principle and the di¤erence principle.
Contingent on the arguments listed above, it follows that a social insurance pro-
gram is consistent with Rawlsian principles. Paden continues in the essay to enumerate
the values of the ideal social insurance program. He concludes that an ideal social in-
surance program would o¤er high minimum benets. He does not o¤er a dollar amount,
but notes that "because the average minimum [social insurance] benets are usually
well above those paid by the welfare programs, social insurance programs reduce the
need for social welfare benets" (1998, p. 192). A second virtue of social insurance
programs is that the distribution of benets to all workers who reach old age engenders
the view that benets have been "earned." Even if these benets are progressive, the
link to work reduces the strain wealthier contributors may feel. Paden goes as far as
to suggest a social insurance program binds society together "around a common inter-
est" (1998, p.192). He argues that because "everyone has a stake" in a social insurance
program, it becomes a very popular program (1998, p.195). Paden believes a social
insurance program also increases the incentive for all members of society to work hard.
Contemporary economists would certainly disagree with this assertion (See, for exam-
ple, Feldstein 1996), but Paden believes the promise of future benets encourages all
to work harder to increase the size of their benet. As a nal virtue, Paden notes that
social insurance programs not only o¤er insurance against catastrophic risk, but also
14
insure "life plans" by protecting against "the possibility of economic decline later in
life" (1998, p.194).
Paden concludes that the US social security system closely matches the ideal
social insurance program individuals would select in a Rawlsian legislative state. As
such, he advocates reform proposals (to cope with the coming demographic shock) that
do not change the basic structure of the program, such as increasing the tax base to
include all payroll wages (not just those below the taxable maximum) or by gradually
increasing the retirement age to 70. He o¤ers poignant criticism of more drastic reform
measures, such as moving towards a fully funded, or privatized system. He explains,
"Certain types of reformwould be unjust. Indeed, I believe that many suggested
reforms are not driven by a search for justice, nor even by any problems internal to the
social security program, but instead are the result of sloppy and/or ideological thinking"
(1998, p.196). Im not sure Rawls would use such strong language to condemn specic
social security reforms. However, I do believe he would agree with Paden that the
current US social security system closely mirrors an ideal form of social insurance, and
that coupled with social welfare, can insure a tolerable social minimum for all members
of society.
Economic theory presents a more systematic approach to evaluating if a social
program or reform is consistent with Rawlsphilosophy. Using the mathematical maxi-
min principle, economists select Rawlsian policy by choosing taxes and benets to
maximize utility, or happiness, for the least well-o¤ individual in the model. This
mathematical optimization is called the maxi-min principle because it maximizes the
minimum value of a selected variable, in this case, utility. Applying this maxi-min
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principle more broadly that is, without specifying the mathematical form of the utility
equation we can infer a Rawlsian reform is simply a reform that increases the utility of
the worst-o¤ member of society. It seems any reform that increases the social security
benets of the poor (by either directly increasing the dollar amount of benets, or
indirectly by extending the period over which social security remains solvent) without
increasing the tax burden of the poor would achieve this Rawlsian objective. Of course,
we could construct a variety of di¤erent utility functions to prove this relationship. As
long as we dene utility as an increasing function of consumption, then any policy that
increases the ability of the poor to consume, either by increasing their benets or by
reducing their taxes, will increase their utility.
I will use the economic maxi-min principle, and the Rawlsian notion of social wel-
fare as a backdrop for evaluating policy. If a specic social security reform does nothing
to improve the condition of the poorest individual in society, such as across-the-board
benet cuts, I will rule this reform out as "non-Rawlsian." I will only consider reforms
that increase the well being of the poor, or in the words of the Senate Aging Committee
reforms that "protect the economically vulnerable" (from Committee Website).
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CHAPTER 3.
SOCIAL SECURITY REFORMS
In the remaining sections of the paper, I will present the mainstream social
security reforms that are consistent with a Rawlsian perspective. These reforms all
take one of two basic forms: tax increases, or benet adjustments. The reforms I will
discuss are, for the most part, minor adjustments that could be made to the current
system unlike a serious structural reform such as moving towards a fully funded system.
I will begin with a discussion of Rawlsian reforms that increase taxes. All of the tax
proposals I will consider involve increasing the tax base by increasing or removing the
tax cap on earnings.
Following the tax increase proposals, I will discuss Rawlsian reforms that alter
future benets. Both the Senate Aging Committee and the CBO suggest reforms
that would increase benets for the poor. These types of reform are consistent with
Rawlsian philosophy, but they fail to address the nancial constraints imposed by the
demographic shock. I will include reforms of this type for illustrative purposes. If
policymakers choose to increase benets for the poor as part of a Rawlsian response,
this could be nanced though an increase in taxes. Thus, it is feasible that a Rawlsian
solution could include both tax increases, and increases in benets for some workers.
After I consider reforms that increase benets, I will examine reforms that make some
attempt to address the demographic shock by decreasing future benets for the wealthy.
As a special case, I will present a detailed, mathematical example of three adjustments
that can be made to the benet-earning rule to balance the budget without lowering
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the benets of the poor. One of the adjustments is nanced by increasing taxes, the
other two are self-sustaining. Not all of the reforms discussed would be implemented
along the same timeline. Some o¤er solutions that are gradually phased in over time.
Others o¤er one-time changes that would improve the long-run solvency of the system.
I will indicate the timing of each reform individually, as follows in the paper.
3.1 Rawlsian reforms that increase taxes
The rst group of Rawlsian reforms I will consider are proposals to remove the
tax cap on the social security payroll tax. Several variations to this basic reform are
possible. The cap could be increased, or removed entirely. The additional income taxed
could be included in the current calculation of benets (e¤ectively extending the third
leg of the benet-earning rule to the right), or the additional income could be excluded
from benets. If the additional income is considered for benets, it could be done using
a new benet-earning rule that pays reduced benets on the highest portion of income.
I will discuss the merits of removing (or increasing) the tax cap broadly rst, then I
will assess the specic permutations mentioned above.
Motivation. As briey mentioned in the introduction, social security taxes
are levied on all payroll earnings up to a maximum level that increases with ination.
The current maximum amount is $106,800.The payroll tax is levied at a at rate of
12.4 percent (evenly split between employee and employer). As a result of the cap,
lower-income earners pay a higher fraction of their income in social security taxes than
do high-income earners. Using the employer and employee share of the social security
tax, as well as the Medicare portion of the payroll tax, economist John Irons calculates
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that the e¤ective payroll tax for the second quintile (20-40 percent) of wage earners
is 10.4 percent. The e¤ective payroll tax rate for the third quintile (40-60 percent)
is nearly identical at 10.9 percent. By contrast, the top 1 percent of earners pays an
e¤ective payroll tax of only 1.5 percent. The top 0.1 percent of earners pays an e¤ective
payroll tax of 0.7 percent. The social security payroll tax is, by virtue of the tax cap,
a regressive tax1. Irons o¤ers the following illustrative example:
More concretely, workers making $106,800 or less pay a at 6.2 percent
for Social Security on their earnings, as do their employers. Since the most
employees and employers can each owe is $6,622 (6.2 percent x $106,800),
the tax rate for someone earning a million dollars per year and their em-
ployer is just 0.66 percent ($6,622/$1,000,000), roughly one tenth the rate
paid by most workers. (p.3-4)
About 6 percent of the population has earnings above this cap, a percentage
that has remained relatively constant since the 1983 amendments. However, the share
of earnings that fall above the cap has increased. This is the result of increasing income
inequality. "Those with incomes above the cap have seen a faster pace of growth that
those with incomes below" (Irons, 2009, p.3). In 1983, 91 percent of US wages fell
below the maximum taxable amount. In 2009, only 83 percent of earnings fell below
the maximum taxable amount. (See Figure 3). Much of the demographic shock could
be absorbed by increasing the tax base to include 90-100 percent of wage earnings.
1Although the social security tax is regressive the benet structure is progressive. However, that
progressivity is mitigated by the fact that high wage earners live longer and therefore collect more
social security benets compared to low wage earners. (See Irons, 2009, and Pozen, 2010). Therefore,
it is di¢ cult to assess if the program is truly regressive or progressive.
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Option 1: Eliminate the cap do not count the additional earnings
towards benets. The most progressive reform (of those that increase or remove the
tax cap) would be to remove the cap entirely without including the additional taxed
earnings in the calculation for benets. This would free up all of the additional taxes
collected to nance benets promised to all workers as currently outlined. The Aging
Committee reports, "If all earned income above $106,800 a year were subject to Social
Security contributions but did not count toward benets, Social security would be
solvent throughout the long-range projection period" (2010, p.46). Under this option,
workers who earn more than $106,800 would pay "considerably more in taxes." The
Aging Committee o¤ers the follow example. "A personal making $400,000 per year
would pay $18,178 more per year and his or her employer would pay a matching amount,
for a total increase of $36,356" (2010, p.46). However, the Committee also notes, "As
workers do not generally have high earnings over their entire careers, the total increase
in taxes paid by individuals over their working lives would be relatively small with a
median increase in lifetime contributions of three percent" (2010, p.46).
Social securitys revenues would increase by 0.9 percentage points of GDP in
2040, or by about 18 percent relative to current law. This improves the 75-year actuarial
balance by 0.9 percentage points of GDP and extends the trust fund exhaustion date
beyond the 75-year mark. This analysis is based on assumption that the cap would be
removed in the year 2012 (CBO, 2010, p.18-19, option 6).
Option 2: Eliminate the cap count the earnings towards benets.
Because social security benets are distributed using a progressive benet-earning rule,
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it is possible to achieve a net budget increase by taxing earnings above the cap and
paying benets for those earnings. The additional benets paid out for the wages above
the cap will be much smaller than the additional taxes collected on these wages. The
Aging Committee states, "If all wages above $106,800 in 2009 were taxed and counted
toward benets, the change would almost make social security solvent through the
long-range period, reducing the payroll decit by 1.89 percent and eliminating about
95 percent of the 75-year shortfall" (2010, p.46). The CBO adds, "This option would
improve the 75-year actuarial balance by 0.6 percentage points of GDP and extend
the trust fund exhaustion date to 2083." This analysis is based on the assumption the
change in taxes and benets would take place in the year 2012 (2010, p.18, option 4).
Option 3: Eliminate the cap count earnings towards benets using
a di¤erent formula. This slight variation of option 2 allows policymakers to tax all
earnings, o¤er benets for all earnings, but extend the solvency to the 75-year mark.
The Aging Committee gives the example of o¤ering benets as currently scheduled up
to the tax cap, then increasing benets at 3 percent (instead of 15 percent). Using the
current bend points, the new benet-earning rule would replace 90 of average monthly
wage earnings up to $744, 32 percent of earnings between $744 and $4,483, 15 percent
of earnings between $4,483 and $8,900, and 3 percent of earnings over $8,900. "This
option, starting in 2010 is estimated to eliminate the 75-year decit, resulting in savings
of 2.17 percent of payroll" (Aging Committee, p.47). However, this reform does not
guarantee scal solvency into perpetuity, it merely delays the exhaustion of the trust
fund beyond the 75-year threshold. (This reform is not considered by the CBO).
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Option 4: Tax all earnings above the taxable maximum at 4 percent
do not increase benets. Like the previous examples, this option subjects all payroll
earnings to a social security tax, but wages currently above the cap would only be taxed
at 4 percent instead of 12.4. The CBO estimates that this reform would increase social
security revenues by about 0.3 percent points of GDP in 2040, or by about 6 percent,
relative to current law. Because the tax rate is lower, this option would, obviously,
generate less revenue. This option would extend the trust fund exhaustion date by
twelve years, to 2051. This analysis assumes the law would change in the year 2012
(CBO, 2010, p.19, option 9).
Option 5: Raise the taxable maximum to cover 90 percent of earnings
count all 90 percent of earnings towards benets. In 1983, 91 percent of earnings
were taxed for social security. Increasing the tax cap to once again cover 90 percent
of earnings would increase social security revenues by about 0.4 percentage points of
GDP in 2040, or by about 8 percent relative to current law according to the CBO.
This would extend the trust fund exhaustion date eleven years, to 2050. The Aging
Committee suggests gradually increasing the tax cap, by two percent per year above
the growth in wages to eventually cover 90 percent of wages. This will take 36 years to
achieve. It would reduce the 75-year decit by 28 percent. This analysis also assumes
the law would change in 2012 (CBO, 2010, p.18, option 5).
Additional variations. The Senate Aging Committee and the CBO both o¤er
additional variations of reform that increase the tax base by increasing or removing
the tax cap. The scal impact of these various adaptations are similar. As one would
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expect, the more aggressive the tax increase, the larger the positive impact on social
securitys 75-year budget. Conversely, the more generous the benets paid on additional
taxes paid, the smaller the impact on social securitys budget.
Winners and losers. High wage earners are the clearly lose under any variation
of this reform. Those earning above the tax cap would see a potentially large increase in
their taxes. Conservatives might add that taxing the wealthy has negative side e¤ects
by decreasing the incentives for the wealthy to work (and generate jobs for others). The
94 percent of wage earners who currently fall below the tax cap will benet relative
to the 6 percent whose taxes would increase. The 94 percent will experience higher
benets for a longer period of time than they would without this reform.
Of course, this brief analysis ignores the long-term feedback e¤ects of increasing
taxes. At a macroeconomic level, increased taxes can lead to lower levels of savings.
Savings fuels capital investment, the purchase of new physical capital. As savings
decreases, so can the accumulation of new capital. And, as the level of capital diminishes
(or at least grows at a smaller rate), the marginal product of laborbetter known simply
as wagesalso decreases. Therefore, increased taxes could lead to lower wages across
the entire economy. Martin Feldstein gives this explanation in the introduction of his
book The E¤ects of Taxation on Capital Accumulation
A high saving rate leads to a high rate of investment in plant and equip-
ment and in housing since the increased ow of saving reduces the equi-
librium cost of funds to prospective borrowers. . . Investment in plant and
equipment is a critical aspect of economic activity, for it contributes di-
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rectly to raising productivity and therefore to raising the nations standard
of living. (1987, p.1)
A more sophisticated model than anything used in the analysis of this paper
would need to be used to incorporate these feedback e¤ects.
Public opinion and politics. Removing the tax cap is one of only two possible
reforms that majority of Americans support.2 67 percent of respondents to a July 2011
Gallup Poll agree, "requiring high-income workers to pay social security taxes on all
of their wages is a good idea." Therefore, it seems politicians may nd support for
this reform. It is somewhat unlikely that tax increases will be tolerable to the 112th
Congress, given the emphasis on cutting government spending and the recent extension
of the Bush tax cuts. However, voters may perceive the social security tax di¤erent
than the federal income tax. The current regressive nature of the tax surely upsets
many lower and middle wage earners.
3.2 Rawlsian reforms that increase future benets
One of the most straightforward ways to increase the utility of the poor, and
therefore achieve the Rawlsian goal of increasing the utility of the lowest members of
society is simply to redistribute more income from the wealthy to the poor. Paden
explains,
Thus, once it is determined how much money can be raised through
taxation, it is only necessary to distribute that money (minus whatever
2This may not be a completely fair comparison, as pollsters only asked about six possible reforms.
Its possible respondents may favor some other type of reform, but were simply not asked about it.
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expenditures are required by the other principles of justice) to the poorest
members of society in such a way as to raise their expectations as high as
those revenues allows. . . one simply distributes the available money, raising
the income of the poor to ever-higher levels, while simultaneously increasing
the number of people receiving transfers, until there is no more money to
distribute. (1998, p.186)
Therefore, the task of the policymaker is fairly simple: she needs only to redis-
tribute as much as possible. If policymakers are not constrained by a balanced budget,
social security reforms that increase the level of redistribution by increasing the bene-
ts of the poor can be considered. In isolation, these reforms amplify the demographic
shock by increasing future outlays even more than currently scheduled by law. How-
ever, if coupled with a su¢ ciently high increase in taxes, a reform that increases benets
for the poor could balance the budget after a demographic shock. I will present three
reform options that increase benets for the poor by implementing a minimum benet.
Motivation. Congress created a special minimum benet in 1972 "intended
to increase benet adequacy for low-earning steady workers" (Aging Committee, 2010,
p.56). This special minimum benet was indexed to prices via the CPI (consumer
price index). The regular social security benet-earnings rule is indexed to wages via
SSA wage index. Wages have increased at a faster rate than prices since 1972, therefore
regular social security benets increased more rapidly than the special minimum benet
(Olsen and Ho¤meyer, 2002, note 1 p.13). Each year fewer beneciaries qualied for
the special minimum and received the regular benet corresponding to their average
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monthly wages. In 2010, the standard benet formula increased enough to nally
surpass the special minimum benet. Thus, no beneciaries are receiving a special
minimum benet, but all are receiving benets as calculated by the benet-earrings
rule. If policymakers feel that current benets for low-wage earners are not su¢ ciently
large (as they thought before implementing the 1972 reform) they could create a new
minimum benet that is higher than the lowest benet currently paid.
Option 6: Modify the special minimum benet and index it to growth
in wages. The current special minimum benet (that was surpassed by the standard
benet-earning rule) is equal to 85 percent of the federal poverty line. Proposals to
increase the special minimum benet suggest calculating the benet as some percentage
greater than or equal to 100 percent of the federal poverty line. For example, the CBO
suggests a special minimum benet starting in 2012 of $1,170, which corresponds to
125 percent of the poverty guideline. This benet could be reduced proportionally for
beneciaries who worker fewer than 30 years. This minimum benet could be indexed
to grow with wages (as are standard benets) to roughly preserve a minimum benet
for a constant fraction of the population.
Social securitys total outlays under this option increase by 0.2 percentage points
of GDP in 2040, or by 4 percent of currently scheduled outlays. This option would
worsen the 75-year balance by 0.2 percentage points of GDP, and the trust fund would
be depleted two years earlier, in 2037. The analysis assumes the reform is phased in,
starting in the year 2012 (CBO, 2010, p. 28, option 23).
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Option 7: Enhance low-earnersbenets on the basis of years worked.
This is an enhancement to the benet-earning rule proposed by the CBO. They suggest
increasing the initial benet for lifetime workers (those who have worked 20 years or
more) by a specied percentage that would depend both on the number of years worked,
and the average monthly wage earned. An individual, who worked between 20-40 years
and earned less than the average wage, would receive a percentage increase in his or
her initial benet between 0-40 percent. The maximum increase would be 40 percent,
and that would be available to those who worked 35 years or more and whose average
monthly earnings were less than or equal to the earnings of someone who worked full-
time, at the minimum wage for 30 years. The minimum increase would be available for
a worker who earned slightly below the average wage and only worked for 20 years.
Under this reform, social securitys outlays would increase by 0.4 percentage
points of GDP in 2040, or by 7 percent form currently scheduled outlays. This option
would worsen the 75-year balance by 0.3 percentage points of GDP, and the trust fund
would be exhausted 5 years earlier, in 2034. This analysis assumes the changes would
be made in the year 2012 (CBO 2010, p. 29, option 25).
Option 8: Supplementing benets for low-income single workers. The
Senate Aging Committee denes the economically vulnerable as low wage earners, but
also emphasizes the economic needs of low-income workers who never married, or di-
vorced before qualifying for spousal benets. Generally, these beneciaries are women.
Therefore, they consider a reform proposal to directly target low-income single workers.
They suggest supplementing benets for eligible, low-wage, single workers by adjusting
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"the rst threshold [or bend point] in the benet formula. . . so that it increased by
one-half from $744 to $1,116" (Aging Committee, 2010, p.58). This would increase the
benet received by extending the 90 percent of the rst leg of the benet-earning rule.
To be eligible for this special benet-earning rule, a workers average monthly wages
would have to be lower than some multiple of the rst bend point, such as 150 percent.
This option has not received unanimous support. The committee explains,
"While some retirement experts are supportive of this option because it focused on
the needs of low-income women, others questions the rationale for basing eligibility on
marital status" and suggested expanding the benet (2010, p.58). The committee does
not o¤er a cost analysis of this reform, noting only that "the extent to which this option
a¤ects solvency will depend largely on the number of people who would be eligible for
it" (2010, p.58). In any case, it would increase social security outlays without increase
revenues and would therefore expedite the exhaustion of the trust fund, if even by a
small amount. (This reform is not considered by the CBO).
Winners and losers. The low-income workers who receive larger social security
benets as a result of these reforms appear to win relative to other benet recipients.
However, depending how the increased benets are nanced, the poor who receive larger
benets may also bear a fraction of the cost. As long as the poor did not pay the full
cost of increasing benets, then they would gain relative to other recipients. If revenues
are not increased to nance the higher benets, it is unclear if the poor benet inter-
temporally. In the short-run, the poor who qualify for larger benets would experience
increased consumption. However, those who live long beyond the exhaustion of the
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trust fund would (presumably) see their benets reduced. Depending on the inter-
temporal preferences of the recipients, this reform could increase, decrease, or fail to
alter lifetime happiness. For example, if a worker has a low (or possibly negative) inter-
temporal discount rate, meaning she discounts future consumption very little compared
to current consumption, she may not prefer this reform because it increase her current
benets, but causes her future benets to be reduced sooner. If she has a high discount
rate, then she would prefer this reform (even if it is not nanced) because it increases
her current, or relatively near, consumption.
Workers who do not qualify for increased benets will experience decreased life-
time consumption regardless of the nancing of the reform. If the reform is nanced by
a tax increase, these workers will pay higher taxes, but will not receive higher benets.
If the reform is not nanced, workers who do not receive higher benets, experience no
change in consumption in the short-run. However, in the long-run, their consumption
will be lower because the trust fund will be depleted sooner and benets will fall earlier
than without the reform. As in the previous section, this brief analysis ignores the
potential feedback e¤ects of changing taxes and benets.
Public opinion and politics. It is di¢ cult to gauge public support for reforms
that increase minimum benets because we do not have public opinion data on the
subject. Given the prevalent concern that future benets will fall, Pollsters have not
asked about reforms that increase future benets. Presumably reform options that
increase benets for the poor will nd support with (some) liberals who worry about
providing for the economically vulnerable. However, it seems unlikely liberals could
29
gather enough political support to increase benets when program is already expected
to run decits after 2016.
3.3 Rawlsian reforms that change the benet-earning rule
A third possibility for Rawlsian social security reforms is reforms that modify
the benet-earning rule to balance the budget. The Senate Aging Committee does not
directly consider any reforms that alter the shape of the benet-earning rule. The com-
mittee considers multiple reforms that alter the wage indexing of the benet-earning
rule. However, these reforms are not explicitly Rawlsian. In e¤ect, these reforms grad-
ually reduce the bend points of the benet-earning rule without changing the slopes of
the three legs of the rule. These reforms reduce future benets for almost all workers
relative to currently scheduled benets. The only workers who would not see a reduc-
tion in benets are those who earn below the rst bend point in the future. If real
wages grow (as many of these reforms assume) and the bend points do not increase (as
the reforms might mandate), or if the bend points do not increase as quickly as wages,
then the fraction of the population who earn a wage below the rst bend point will
decline. Therefore, the fraction of the population whose benets are equal to current
law decreases over time. Reforms of this kind gradually decrease benets (compared
to currently scheduled benets) for a larger and larger segment of the population (as-
suming real wages grow).
Motivation. It is possible to decrease future benets for the wealthy while
maintaining the current level of benets for the poor. This could be achieved by
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altering the upward section(s) of the benet-earning rule. The Brookings Institute
explains, "Congress could therefore gradually slow the growth of social security benets
for middle and high earner [and] lower-wage earns would receive everything they are now
promised" (Pozen, 2011, p.1). The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) uses similar
language in advocating social security reforms. They state directly, "social security
benets for high earners should be reduced" (Biggs, 2010, p.1).
Option 9: Reduce the slopes of the second and third legs of the benet-
earning rule. The CBO considers the specic example of reducing the slopes of the
second and third legs of the benet-earning rule from their current values of 32 percent
and 15 percent to 20 percent and 10 percent. This is roughly a reduction of one third
for the two upper sections of the benet-earning rule. The benet reduction under this
option is greater for people with higher earnings. The benets of the wage earners
below the rst bend point are maintained as currently scheduled by law. Thus, the
new benet-earning rule is more progressive than the current rule.
Under this reform, social securitys outlays would decline by 1.0 percentage
points of GDP in 2040, or by 16 percent compared to current law. This option improves
the 75-year actuarial balance by 0.7 percentage points of GDP and extends the trust
fund exhaustion date beyond the 75-year mark. It does not, however, preserve social
security into perpetuity. The trust fund would become deleted shortly after the 75-
year mark. Unlike previous examples, the analysis of this reform assumes the law
would change in the year 2017 (CBO, 2010, p.21-22, option 13).
Option 10: Reduce the slope of the third leg of the benet-earning
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rule. Similar to option 1, this reform reduces the slope above the second bend point
from 15 percent to 10 percent. This reform would only a¤ect benets for those who
earn above the second bend point. In 2010, 29 percent of 62-year-old new beneciaries
had an average monthly income above the second bend point. The CBO o¤ers the
following example, "in 2017 [the second] bend point would be $5,114 in 2010 dollars,
and a worker with average monthly earnings of $6,000 would receive monthly benets
that were $44 lower than under current law" (2010, p.22).
Because this reform protects benets for a larger segment of the population
(benet are only reduced for those above the second bend point), it has a smaller
impact on solvency. Social security outlays would decline by 0.1 percentage point of
GDP in 2040, or by 2 percent from currently scheduled outlays. "This option does not
signicantly extend the trust fund exhaustion date" (CBO, 2010, p.22, option 14).
Option 11: Lower initial benets for the top 70 percent of earners. This
option is often called "progressive price indexing." The name is somewhat misleading,
because this type of reform does not actually change the way intial social security
benets are indexed, but rather gradually diminishes the slope of the benet-earning
rule. Under this reform, the scheduled benets for the bottom 30 percent of earners
remain unchanged. The initial benets of the remaining 70 percent will be reduced by
gradually attening out the upper 70 percent of the benet-earning rule. The slope
for the "top 70 percent of earners would be gradually reduced so that initial benets
for such earners would decline over time relative to those scheduled under current law"
(CBO, 2010, p.24). The slopes will be reduced in such a way that initial benets for
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the highest earners would grow with the rate of price, instead of with wages. A critical
of assumption of this proposal is that real wages will continue to grow at a higher rate
than prices.
The CBO explains that this reform would be implemented by adding a third
bend point to the benet-earning rule that corresponds to the 30 percentile of wage
earners. By 2040, the new bend point would be at about $2,560, between the rst bend
point at $1,130 and the highest bend point at $6,830.The slope of the line segment
between the rst bend point and the new bend point would remain at 32 percent. The
slope of the two segments above the new bend point would be reduced every year. By
the year 2080 both slopes would fall to zero. Figure 4 depicts what the benet-earning
rule would look like in the years 2040 and 2080 under this reform.
The reform option decreases social securitys total outlays by 0.4 percentage
points of GDP in 2040, or by 7 percent of currently scheduled outlays. This option
improves the 75-eary actuarial balance by 0.5 percentage points of GDP, and extends
the trust fund exhaustion date for ve years, to 2044. The CBO notes that the relative
savings of this reform are modest "because it would be phased in slowly." The analysis
of this reform assumes the intial changes would take place in 2017 (2010, p.23, option
18).
Option 12: lower initial benets for the top 50 percent of earners. This
option is nearly identical to option 11. The key di¤erence is that benets are protected
for the bottom 50 percent of earners (instead of only the bottom 30 percent). The
slopes of the benet-earning rule for wages for the top 50 percent of the population
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would be gradually reduced under this reform. The slopes would adjusted in such a way
that benets for high earners would only increase at the rate of price growth instead
of wage growth. Like option 11, this option relies heavily on the assumption that real
wages will continue to grow at a higher rate than prices.
A new bend point would be introduced to cover 50 percent of wage earners on
each side. The slopes of the benet-earning rule below this new bend point would
remain unchanged while the slopes above the bend point would gradually fall to zero.
The two slopes above the new bend point would reach a zero slope by 2057. The CBO
explains, "the top two factors reach zero earlier than in [option 11] because the second
bend point occurs at a higher level of earnings" (2010, p.24).
Social securitys total outlays would fall by 0.4 percentage points of GDP in
2040 or by 6 percentage points compared to current law under this reform. This option
improves the 75-year actuarial balance by 0.4 percentage points of GDP and extends
the trust fund exhaustion date by four years, to 2043. Like option 11, the analysis of
this reform assumes the initial changes take place in 2017 (CBO, 2010, p. 24, option
19).
Winners are losers. The low-wage earners who do not receive benet reduc-
tions under these reforms clearly win relative to current law and relative to high-wage
earners. Low wage earners are better o¤ under any of these four reforms compared to
current law because the trust fund exhaustion is delayed. They receive the same benets
for an extended period of time without paying higher taxes. This is, of course, made
possible by decreasing future benets for high wage earners. As before, this analy-
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sis excluded the feedback e¤ects of changing benets. Again, this analysis excludes
the feedback e¤ects of changing benets, which may change consumersspending and
savings decisions and indirectly impact capital accumulation and wages.
Public opinion and politics. Reducing future benets for the wealthy is
one of only two reform proposals that a majority of Americans nd tolerable. (The
other tolerable reform is increasing the tax base to include income above the current
tax cap.) 63 percent of respondents in a July 2010 Gallup Poll agree that "limiting
benets for wealthy retirees" is a "good idea to address concerns with the social security
system." It seems politicians may nd initial support for reforms of this nature as long
as they are phased in over time. Any attempt to reduce benets for those who are
about to retire would be met with resistance from older voters. It is important to note
that none of the adjustments to the benet-earning rule discussed in this section would
decrease benets for current retirees. The benet-earning rule is used to calculate initial
benets, thus, anyone who is currently receiving benets would not be a¤ected. Older
Americans vote at much higher rate than their younger contemporaries (Baumgartner
and Francia, 2008), therefore politicians are unlikely to do anything to upset current
retirees.
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CHAPTER 4.
SPECIAL CASE: THREE ADJUSTMENTS TO THE
BENEFIT-EARNING RULE
Thus far in the paper, I have only evaluated reforms originally proposed by the
government (either via the Senate Aging Committee, or the CBO). None of the twelve
reforms I have discussed are able to fully cope with the coming demographic shock.
Option 1 (remove the tax cap, do not count additional earnings towards benets) and
option 3 (remove the tax cap, count all earnings towards benets using a new rule) both
extend the trust fund exhaustion date beyond the 75-year threshold used in government
long-term projections. However, neither provides solvency beyond 75 years. The CBO
examined 30 reform proposals, and only one produced sustainable solvency. That
reform, (their option 17) gradually reduces benets for all workers and assumes that
real wages grow at a rate higher than prices. In the case that real wages do not grow
at a higher rate than prices (or if the di¤erence between the two rates is less than the
CBO projects) none of the 30 reforms considered would produce long-term solvency.
The CBO explains how long-term solvency might be achieved.
One way to sustain solvency is to have a trust fund ratio that is positive
throughout the projection period and then stable or growing after 75 years.
Neither increasing the payroll tax by 2.0 percentage points over two decades
nor cutting benets by 15 percent would result in sustainable solvency; the
trust funds would be exhausted around the end of the projection period and
the trust fund ratio would still be declining after 75 years. (2010, p.13)
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In the following section of the paper I will suggest three new adjustments to
the benet-earning rule that extend solvency beyond the 75-year threshold and into
perpetuity. Two of these options are self-sustaining without changing taxes. The third
option is sustainable with a specied increase in taxes. In all three cases, I assume
the trust fund has already been exhausted. Therefore, the adjustments I consider do
require drawing down the trust fund, but can leave it exactly as it is today. I also
assume that real wages will not grow in my calculations. If real wages do increase,
then the adjustments I suggest will actually lead to social security surpluses. Because
my analysis does not use trust fund resources, I do not specify a year for the policy
change. I take a worse case scenario and assume the ratio of workers to retirees has
already fallen from 3 to 2. Therefore, my analysis holds for any future date as long as
the ratio of workers to retirees is at or above 2. Depending on the assumptions about
the trust fund and real wage growth that policymakers are comfortable making, they
may ultimately wish to implement reforms smaller in scope than those I will present
below.
The three adjustments to the benet-earning rule that I consider, as well as
the corresponding theoretical and quantitative results, are taken from the working
paper "Rawls, Pensions, and Demographic Shocks" by Frank Caliendo1 (Utah State
University) and myself, Erin Cottle. The theory is developed in the appendix (section
6) of this paper.
In this section I will focus on three concrete adjustments to the current benet-
1With Dr. Caliendos permission I will reproduce sections of the Rawls, Pensions, and Demo-
graphic Shockspaper within this document.
37
earning rule that are naturally easy to understand and technically easy to implement.
These three options are designed to meet the goals of the GAO and Senate Aging
Committee, and each option keeps the budget balanced under future demographics. In
all cases, we2, assume a large demographic shock (from 3.3 to 2.0 workers per retiree).
Option 13: Protect the benets of the maximum number of poor
individuals without a tax increase. In this option, the policymaker leaves the
current benet-earning rule in place for as many poor earners as possible, and then the
benet rule becomes at thereafter. In our calibrated model, the benet rule can be left
intact for everyone below 41 percent of the mean wage (about twice the magnitude of the
rst bend point), which corresponds to protecting benets for the bottom 20 percent
of the population. To then balance the budget without a tax increase, it becomes
necessary to completely atten out the remaining portion of the benet-earning rule
(zero slope after 41 percent of the mean wage). All wage earners who earn above 41
percent of the mean will receive the same benet as the current benet of the threshold
earner (namely b(w^jR) in the appendix).
Figure 7 shows the new benet-earning rule (denoted by b^(w) in equation (7)
of the appendix) which traces the current benet rule (b(wjR) (equation (6) of the
appendix) up to the threshold value and then continues as a at line. The current
benet rule is shown as the thin line, the new rule is depicted with a thick line. The
new rule balances the budget without reducing benets for anyone with wage earnings
below the threshold. A depiction of the wage density function (f(w) from equation
2I will use plural pronouns "we" and "our" in reference to the model, because I worked with Dr.
Caliendo to develop the theory and results.
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(23) in the appendix) has been superimposed over Figure 7 to show the fraction of
the population whose benets remain intact. The area under the left tail of the wage
density function represents the fraction of the population whose benets are preserved.
This benet rule protects the benets for the bottom 20 percent of the population Thus
the policymaker is able to preserve benets for the poorest 20 percent of the population
and balance the budget after the demographic shock without a tax increase.
Option 14: Protect a larger share of the population through a tax
increase. Protecting benets for more than 20 percent of the population while main-
taining a weakly increasing benet-earning rule as in Policy 13 can be accomplished
only with a tax increase. As an example, we create a post-shock benet-earning rule
that maintains the current level of benets for the bottom half of wage earners and is
nanced with a 5 point increase in the tax rate. Thus, in this option the new benet-
earning rule exactly traces the old rule up to the mean wage (almost up to the second
bend point) and then attens out thereafter.
Figure 8 depicts this adjustment to the benet-earning rule The baseline (b(wjR)
equation (6) in the appendix), the new benet rule without a tax increase (b^(w) equation
(7) in the appendix) and the new rule with a 5-percentage point tax increase (b(w)
equation (7) in the appendix) are all graphed together in Figure 8. Both new benet
rules initially trace the baseline rule and then atten out. The tax increase allows
the rule in option 14, to trace the baseline beyond the threshold in Figure 7 up to 94
percent of the mean wage. Beyond this wage, the rule delivers a constant benet that
is equal to the current benet for 0:94 of the mean wage. It is clear from the graph
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that the new rule with a tax increase is able to protect benets up to a higher wage
than the new rule without a tax increase (option 13). A depiction of the wage density
function has been superimposed over the graph to show the fraction of the population
whose benets remain intact. The area under the left half of the wage density function
represents the fraction of the population protected by this reform. The policymaker is
able to preserve benets for bottom half of wage earners and balance the budget with
a 5 percentage point tax increase after the demographic shock.
Policy Option 15: Protect the benets of the poor and also maintain
a strictly increasing benet-earning rule. As a third option, we show that the
benet-earning rule can be left exactly as it currently is up to the rst bend point (90
percent slope up to 20 percent of the mean wage) if the slopes of the second and third
legs of the benet-earning rule drop from the current slopes of 32 percent and 15 percent
to the new slopes of 10 percent and 3 percent, respectively. The new rule balances the
budget, protects the benets of the very poorest segment of the population (those
below the rst bend point), maintains a strictly positive slope, and does not require
additional taxes. Of course, if a tax increase is tolerable, then the slopes of the second
and third legs can be kept closer to the original slopes. Some variation of this third
option may be the most attractive to policymakers since the Senate Aging Committee
has advocated the so-called "equity principle," which means that benets received bear
some relationship to the amount of taxes paid.
Figure 9 illustrates the new rule (b0(w) equation (7) in the appendix), that
protects benets for individuals below the new threshold and maintains a strictly pos-
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itive slope without changing the tax rate. Our new rule traces the original benet rule
up to the threshold and then continues as an increasing function, albeit with a some-
what atter slope. We consider the example of protecting benets up to the rst bend
point in the current US rule, which is 20 percent of the mean wage. (In the model,
this is achieved by setting w0 in equation (7) to w1 from equation (22), both in the
appendix). A depiction of the wage density function has been superimposed over the
graph. The area under the left tail of the wage density function shows the fraction of
the population whose benets remain intact. This benet rule protects the benets for
the bottom 9 percent of the population and maintains the positive benet-earning link
for all wages. This is done without a tax increase.
Figure 10 illustrates a potential future benet-earning rule that protects benets
for the poor and maintains a strictly positive slope. In an e¤ort to keep the new benet
rule similar to the current US rule, we create a piecewise continuous benet rule that
has the same bend points as the current US rule. This new benet rule keeps the same
slope on the rst segment of the current rule, but the slopes of the second and third
legs are chosen to best t the new benet function b0(w):
min
2;3
"Z w+
w1
[b0(w)  bUS(w)]2 dw
#
; (26)
subject to
bUS(w) =
8>><>>:
w11 + (w   w1)2; for w1  w  w2;
w11 + (w2   w1)2 + (w   w2)3; for w2  w  w3;
(27)
b0(w) = b(w1jR)

w
w1
0
; (28)
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where 0 solves the balanced budget constraint (See appendix equation (18), and set
w0 = w1). The result is a new benet-earning rule, which maintains the benets of
those below the rst bend point, keeps the slope of every segment strictly positive to
maintain the benet-earning link, and balances the budget after the demographic shock
without a tax increase. The result of this process gives slopes for the second and third
legs equal to 2 = 10% and 3 = 3%.
If the drop in the ratio of workers to retirees ultimately is less severe than we
are assuming, then more than the bottom 20 percent of the earning distribution can
be protected in Option 13, less than a 5 point increase in the tax would be needed to
protect the bottom 50 percent of earners in Option 14, and the slopes of the second
and third segments of the benet-earning rule can be greater than 10 percent and 3
percent in Option 15.
Winners and losers. As in the pervious section, the poor whose benets are
protected gain relative to the wealthy whose benets fall. This also ignores the feedback
e¤ects of changing benets. The assessment of public opinion and politics is likewise
similar to the previous section.
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CHAPTER 5.
POLITICAL FEASIBILITY
Throughout the paper, I have shown, quantitatively, how to protect social secu-
rity benets for a signicant share of poor individuals after a demographic shock. How-
ever, even the most convincing quantitative results do not guarantee policy change. In
addition to being quantitatively feasible, a realistic policy solution needs to also be po-
litically feasible in order to be implemented. Even though I have taken reform proposals
directly from the government, and in the special case, have focused on operationalizing
an openly stated, government goal, there is no reason to assume such a goal is feasible.
Thus, while the primary focus of this paper is to present a menu of Rawlsian social
security reforms for policymakers to consider, I want to make sure the suggested policy
responses are relevant for real-world policymaking. This requires that I show that the
reforms considered throughout the paper are, at least partially, politically tolerable.
There are at least three ways to gauge the political feasibility of policy propos-
als: (i) by drawing inferences from existing theoretical work in public choice, (ii) by
considering the preferences and stated objectives on Congress and other policymakers,
and (iii) by considering public opinion. I will address each of these topics in sequence.
5.1 Public Choice Theory
A substantive literature on the political economy of social security has developed
in public choice theory. Beginning with Browning (1975), economists have modeled the
politically optimal social security tax rate for a pay-as-you-go system, given age (and
later labor productivity) heterogeneity. (See Casamatta, Cremer, and Pestieau (2000)
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for a discussion of the development of these models). A more recent paper by Galasso,
Profeta, Haskel, and Ventura (2004) assesses the political viability of social security
under a demographic shock. Their model suggests an increasing dependency ratio (the
ratio of retirees relative to workers) will "[induce] agents to substitute their claims
towards future pensions with more private savings, and the size of the system should
be reduced. Aging, however, also has a direct political impact: as an older electorate
increases the relevance of pension spending on the agenda of policymakers, it tends to
foster larger and more generous systems" (p.66). They nd the latter e¤ect to outweigh
the former.
Galasso et al. share an additional insight that is relevant to the model developed
in section 4. They explain that, "The key intuition [of their paper] is that the social
security systems we observe need not be welfare enhancing: they only need to be
sustained politically. In democracies, this support is represented by the approval of
a majority of the Parliament or, more directly, of the electorate" (2004, p.78). It is
not necessary for a policy to be socially optimal in order to be politically feasible.
Throughout the paper, I make no e¤ort to assess the social optimality of the reforms
discussed; rather I view my contribution as the operationalization of an already existing
governmental desire to maintain benets for the economically vulnerable in light of a
demographic shock. I leave it up to the policymaker to decide if she should implement a
one of the reforms. Like the CBO, I simply provide suggestions about the quantitative
impacts of such a decision.
These theoretical models provide a useful backdrop for the discussion at hand.
The results indicate that an aging population will favor a larger social security program.
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However, the theoretical models do not reveal a preference for the shape of the benet-
earnings rule or optimal tax base. Casamatta, Cremer, and Pestieau abstract to a
"constitutional phase" when agents express preference not only for the size of the social
security program, but also for the level of intra-generational redistribution within the
system. They conclude,
Even from a pure Rawlsian viewpoint, it may be optimal to adopt a
benet rule that is not "too redistributive." Interestingly, the less redistrib-
utive than otherwise optimal benet rule is not (or not only) adopted to
mitigate labour market distortions but also to induce a majority to opt for
generous retirement benets. (2000, p.505)
This theoretical result suggests that, at least in the abstracted constitutional
state, voters may prefer a benet-earnings rule similar to options 9, 10, or 15 that
maintains a strictly positive slope over a more Beveridgean1 system.
5.2 Congress
Social security is administered as directed by law. Any change to the social secu-
rity benet structure would have to come through legislation. Therefore, it is prudent
to discuss the politics of Congress. In his 1998 paper, "The Politics of Reforming Social
Security" political scientist Douglas Arnold explains
Policy analysts often avoid questions of political feasibility, preferring
to design programs that they believe will best achieve certain ends, while
1For a denition of a Beveridgean system refer to the appendix, section 6.
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leaving it to politicians to "do the right thing." Sometimes this works nicely,
and elected politicians enact analystshandiwork. Quite frequently, how-
ever, the absence of early political analysis leads to unhappy outcomes.
(p.213)
Social security has long been a hot-button issue in American politics. Conven-
tionally referred to as the "third rail of politics," touching social security can shock a
politicians career.2 Public support for social security has historically been high, and
remains so today. Any e¤ort to reform the system will likely be met with resistance.
Unfortunately, it is di¢ cult to directly gauge congressional support for a given
social security reform. Politicians give broadly appealing messages and hesitate to
say anything that may alienate voters. For example, the Senate Committee on Aging
claims, "Social security can be strengthened, benets for those who need them most can
be increased, and long-term solvency can be ensured with just a few, small common-
sense changes" (from website). This general statement promises increased benets and
long-term solvency without mentioning sacrice. It is a politically appealing message
that may garner support from most voters. Policy analyst Paul Light explains why
legislators favor broadly appealing messages. "The dangers of a mistake [regarding
social security] are so great that most members of Congress try to keep their opinions
to themselves" (Light, 1985, p.15). A quick browse of current congressional websites
reveals that neither the Speaker of the House Boehner, nor the Senate Minority Leader
McConnell explicitly mentions social security reform on his "issues" page. House Mi-
2For an interesting discussion of the origin of the phrase third railsee Language: Tracking the
source of the third railwarning - Opinion - International Herald Tribuneby William Sare published
Feb 18, 2007 in the New York Times.
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nority Leader Pelosi dedicates a tab on her website to social security, but only promises
to ght privatization. (This is substantive policy advocacy, but it is a policy that is
clearly opposed by a majority of her constituents, therefore it is not politically risky.
She avoids taking a stand on more di¢ cult aspects of social security). Senate Majority
Leader Reid is the only one of the four leaders to mention the "long term challenges"
facing social security. Yet even he emphasizes "it is not a crisis." Similar language can
be found on many congressional web pages. If these politicians have specic opinions
on social security reform, they are not sharing them with the public.
Speaking of the 1983 social security reform, (the late) Representative Conable
explained,
We in Congress are very good at giving people relative advantages but
incredibly inept at assigning relative disadvantages. In social security, weve
run out goodies to pass out, and we have no choice but to ask some part of
all the people involved to lower their expectations (Light, 1985, p.15).
Advocating a specic policy reform therefore, puts members of Congress in the
di¢ cult situation of denying some constituency its desired political outcome. Thus, a
member of Congress may avoid articulating solid reform proposals, opting instead to
say meaningless sound bites to please voters and stay in o¢ ce. A well-established body
of literature suggests that policymakers are motivated by re-election (See Downs, 1957
and Fiorina, 1977).
Legislators are extraordinarily attentive to what they hear from con-
stituents, careful about how they deal with organized interests, and cau-
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tious when they cast major votes, calculating how specic votes might look
in the middle of the next campaign if challengers decided to focus attention
on them (Arnold, 1998, p.215).
This is potentially devastating for policy. Anthony King explains, "Painfully
often the legislation our politicians pass is designed less to solve problems than to
protect the politicians from defeat in our never-ending election campaigns. They are,
in short, too frightened of us to govern" (1997, p.41).
Therefore, in order to assess congressional appetite for a policy that protects
benets of the poor without (or with a small) tax increase, we must look beyond public
statements, and try to decipher what voters want. It follows that politicians will favor
a reform that pleases a majority of voters.
5.3 Public Opinion
Voters oppose raising taxes and also oppose cutting future benets. Only 35
percent of adults surveyed by ABC News/Washington Post in March 2011 favor raising
the social security tax to address future economic strains on the system. Fewer, 32
percent, favor reducing guaranteed benets for future retirees to restore scal solvency.
(See also Sept 2010 Gallup poll). Even self-identied Tea Partiers oppose cutting social
security benets in order to reduce the decit (see Mar 2011Wall Street Journal Poll).
At rst blush, it appears voters would oppose any e¤ort to balance the social security
budget by reducing benets or increasing taxes. As a result, voters may reject all
policies considered in this paper. However, my analysis of public opinion is limited by
the questions asked by pollsters. I do not have data for many of the nuanced variations
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of social security reform.
In order to approximate the way voters might respond to the reforms presented
in the paper, I searched advocacy groups, the political parties, and prominent policy
think tanks to see what kinds of policies each group supports.
The rst key player I assess is the American Association of Retired Persons
(AARP). With over 37 million members, the AARP has long been one of the most
inuential interest groups on Capitol Hill. Light spoke with a sta¤er who said "most
of the young sta¤ers up there have mothers and fathers who belong to the American
Association of Retired Persons. You think that doesnt make a di¤erence?" (1985, p.76).
Light further explains that the large size of AARP makes it di¢ cult for the organization
to nd policy positions that would appeal to a majority of the membership. Currently,
the organization does not advocate a specic policy solution for the social security scal
imbalance, but only urges its membership to "take a stand" against the "dangerous
cuts" Congress might make. Their social security webpage and advocacy commercials
repeat that Congress should "ensure that future generations get the benets theyve
earned." This language indicates AARPs attachment to future benets. They would
not see benet reduction as a simple policy change, but rather a personal betrayal and
the denial of hard-earned benets. Presumably, they would oppose any of the policy
suggestions motivated by the GAO and Senate Aging Committee that involve benets
cuts and would instead favor policy suggestions that protect the benets of a signicant
share of the population through tax increases.
Second, I looked to the two major political parties themselves to see if either
organization has an ideological response to the looming demographic shock. The De-
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mocratic National Committee praises the success of the social security system, acknowl-
edges the future scal imbalance, but does not o¤er any policy solutions. Instead they
praise their own e¤orts to "[beat] back Republican plans to privatize social security."
The Republican National Committee simply avoids mentioning the issue altogether. It
is unclear if either party would oppose or support increasing the tax base, or modifying
the benet-earnings rule to protect benets of the poor.
Finally, I evaluate policy think tanks to see what kinds of reforms they each
advocate. The Libertarian-leaning Cato Institute has written extensively on social se-
curity reform. They consistently advocate moving toward a fully funded system. The
Heritage Foundation, a conservative group, also advocates movement towards privati-
zation desiring a "system of voluntary personal accounts within social security." The
center-left Brookings Institution believes Congress should "slow the growth of social se-
curity benets for middle and high earners" while still delivering "lower-wage earners"
with "everything they are now promised" (Pozen, 2011, p.1). The Center for American
Progress, a liberal organization, desires reform that "can o¤er the best insurance ben-
ets to those who need them most" while making "progressive changes to the benet
formula" (from website). Surprisingly, the American Enterprise Institute, traditionally
considered a conservative organization (they prominently note that "Ronald Reagan
appointed several dozen AEI scholars and fellows to his administration and to federal
judgeships") states that "social security benets for high earners should be reduced."
They elaborate further, "paying $27,000 per year in benets to a personal who earned
over $100,000 per year cannot be our highest priority" (from website).
It would appear from this cursory survey that if policymakers desire a benet-
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earning rule that maintains benets for the poor without increasing taxes (by reducing
benets for high wage earners), they will nd support with left-leaning organizations
and with AEI. The (potential) bipartisan support of Brookings and AEI is promising
for such a benet-earning rule. Neither political party has su¢ cient power to reform
the system alone (this is particularly true of the 112th Congress that is controlled by
Republicans in the House and Democrats in the Senate). Therefore, any truly feasible
solution will need support from (at least part of) each party.
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CHAPTER 6.
CONCLUSION
All of the quantitative analysis in this paper, both by government agencies
(GAO, Senate Aging Committee, and the CBO) and by Dr. Caliendo and myself
(in the special case) assume an exogenous date of retirement. This abstraction allows
us to calculate the rst round e¤ectsof the various policy proposals discussed in this
paper. The abstraction, however, does not allow agents in the model to respond to
changes in taxes or benets by changing the quantity of labor they supply, in other
words, by changing their date of retirement. Econometric data suggest that individ-
uals do change their behavior based on expected social security benets and taxes.
Therefore, the analysis in this paper should not be taken as a nal conclusion on the
a¤ects of each reform, but rather as a springboard for further investigation. Gokhale
uses a similar simplication in his analysis of six social security reforms. He o¤ers the
following explanation:
[Increasing social security taxes] is unlikely to be costless: weak-
ening linkages between work e¤ort and its rewards by levying higher taxes
and redistributing benets to support relatively less productive workers and
dependents is likely to reduce economic e¢ ciency over time. Estimating the
magnitude of this feedbacke¤ect remains outside the scope of this book.
(2010, 312)
I o¤er the same caveat to this paper. Estimating the feedback e¤ects of the 15
reforms I consider is important, but beyond the scope of this paper. I hope my paper
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serves as a springboard for future discussions of the impacts of social security on the
welfare of the poorest members of society.
It is di¢ cult to predict the political success of any change to social security.
The public is resistant to both tax increases and benet reductions. Legislators act
as delegates and advocate policies with the greatest public support. Conservative and
liberation policy wonks advocate policy that moves towards a fully funded system.
Progressive policy experts advocate reform that increases the redistributive element of
social security. If the position taken by the Brookings Institute and AEI are repre-
sentative of a larger political coalition, It is likely that the Rawlsian adjustments to
the benet-earning rule considered in options 11-151 may garner enough support to
be politically palatable. The Wall Street Journal reported "more than 60 percent of
poll respondents [to their 2011 poll] supported reducing Social Security and Medicare
payments to wealthier Americans" (King and Greenberg, 2011). This majority coupled
with support from AEI and Brookings may be enough to cross the third rail. "The [po-
litical] third rail is not like the one in the subway: if a Republican foot and a Democratic
foot touch it simultaneously, nothing happens" (Sarre, 2007). Reducing benets may
gain support of Republicans who wish to see government spending reduced, and main-
taining the benets for the economically vulnerable may gain support of Democrats.
Therefore, we may able to step onto the third rail with bipartisan support and restore
scal balance to social security with a new benet-earnings rule.
1Note, options 12-15 correspond to equations (7), (7), and (7) in the appendix.
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APPENDIX A.
APPENDIX: COTTLE, CALIENDO THEORY FOR OPTIONS 13, 14
AND 15
Option 13: MaximumProtection of Benets to the Poor without a Tax
Increase. Age is continuous and is indexed by t. At time zero the individual enters
the workforce. Retirement occurs at t = T , and the maximum lifespan is t = T . The
probability of surviving to age t, from the perspective of age zero, is S(t). An innitely
divisible cohort of mass N is born at each moment in time. Let N be constant to
abstract from changes in population size. Due to the innite divisibility assumption,
NS(t) can be interpreted as the number of age-t people alive at any point in calendar
time. We use the term demographic shockto mean an increase in longevity, though
the source of the aging of the population (be it increased longevity, decreased fertility,
baby boom phenomenon, etc.) is not relevant since our analysis below hinges only on
changes in the ratio of workers to retirees, whatever the source of the change.
During the working years, wage income w varies across workers according to the
density function f(w), with support [w ; w+] where
R w+
w  f(w)dw = 1. The function
f(w) is stationary across cohorts. All workers pay social security taxes on wages at
rate . During retirement and conditional on survival, retirees receive a social security
annuity that depends on their wage earnings, b(w): If b0(w) = 0, then everyone gets
the same benets and the system is referred to as Beveridgean.If b(0) = 0 and b0(w)
is a constant and b0(w) > 0 , then benets are the same proportion of earnings for all
individuals and the system is Bismarckian.In this case, the benet-earning function
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is a ray from the origin, whose slope depends on the size of the pension tax rate. We
are interested in the space between the extremes, such as the US, in which the pension
system is both earnings based and redistributive: b(0) = 0, b0(w) > 0 (i.e., the system
is earnings based), and b00(w) < 0 (i.e., the system is redistributive).
In our model we work with a pension system that has a balanced budget. We
impose a balanced budget to impose constraints and tradeo¤s on the choices available
to the policymaker in the model. Thus, aggregate taxes collected equals aggregate
benets received at a moment in timeZ w+
w 
f(w)wdw 
Z T
0
NS(t)dt =
Z w+
w 
f(w)b(w)dw 
Z T
T
NS(t)dt ; (1)
where
R w+
w  f(w)wdw is the average taxes paid per worker and
R T
0
NS(t)dt is the to-
tal number of workers, and
R w+
w  f(w)b(w)dw is the average benet per retiree andR T
T
NS(t)dt is the total number of retirees. To compress notation, we dene
w 
Z w+
w 
f(w)wdw, and R 
Z T
0
NS(t)dt
,Z T
T
NS(t)dt ; (2)
so that (1) can be written compactly
 wR =
Z w+
w 
f(w)b(w)dw: (3)
For convenience, we construct a exible, single-parameter benet-earning rule
that is continuously di¤erentiable in wages and can be calibrated to closely t the US
rule
b(w) = b(w+)
 w
w+

; for  2 [0; 1]; (4)
where  conveniently summarizes the degree of redistribution in the pension system:
as  ! 0, the pension system becomes Beveridgean (everyone receives the same ben-
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ets regardless of contributions); as  ! 1, the pension system becomes Bismarckian
(everyone experiences the same replacement rate); and, for  2 (0; 1), b(w) is strictly
concave and therefore the pension system is both earnings based and redistributive.
Note that the maximum benet b(w+) can be adjusted to ensure the budget
balances. Insert (4) into (3) and solve for b(w+)
b(w+) =  wR
"Z w+
w 
f(w)
 w
w+

dw
# 1
: (5)
Inserting (5) into (4) gives a exible, single-parameter benet-earning rule that is also
consistent with a balanced budget for any value of 
b(wjR) =  wR
"Z w+
w 
f(w)
 w
w+

dw
# 1  w
w+

; for  2 [0; 1]: (6)
The notation b(wjR) is meant to emphasize that the benet-earning rule is conditioned
on the ratio of workers to retirees R. Holding everything else constant (in particular the
degree of redistribution and the tax rate), we see from (6) that a demographic shock
(a reduction in R) would require a proportional decrease in everyones benets.
The goal of a Rawlsian policymaker is to preserve the benets of the poor in the
face of a demographic shock. Let R be the ratio of workers to retirees before the shock
and R^ be the ratio of workers to retirees after the shock. If taxes cannot be raised, the
policymaker is of course constrained by a balanced budget and so everyones benets
cannot be maintained. By assumption, the priority of the policymaker is to preserve
the benets for as many people at the poor end of the distribution as possible, without
interfering with the earnings-based nature of the system. We restrict the policymakers
choice of how redistributive he makes the pension in response to the demographic
shock by forcing the condition that benets must be weakly increasing in earnings. Let
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w^ 2 [w ; w+] be the threshold wage (i.e., maximumwage), below which the policymaker
is able to perfectly maintain benets without increasing taxes, and above which benets
become constant in earnings in order to nance the benets of the poor. Thus, the
Rawlsian policymaker handles the demographic shock by implementing a new benet-
earning rule
b^(w) =
8>><>>:
b(wjR), for w 2 [w ; w^],
b(w^jR), for w 2 [w^; w+].
(7)
Notice that the post-shock1 rule b^(w) perfectly tracks the pre-shock rule b(wjR) until
the threshold wage w^, after which the post-shock rule becomes a at line at the value
b(w^jR).
The threshold parameter w^ is dened by the balanced budget equation, using
the post-shock ratio of workers to retirees R^ and the new benet rule b^(w). Thus, w^ is
the solution to
 wR^ =
Z w+
w 
f(w)b^(w)dw; (8)
which can be rewritten using (7)
 wR^ =
Z w^
w 
f(w)b(wjR)dw +
Z w+
w^
f(w)b(w^jR)dw: (9)
At this level of generality, (9) cannot be solved analytically for w^. Nor can it be solved
analytically when we make explicit but realistic assumptions about the shape of the
density f(w). But, equation (9) can certainly be used to numerically approximate the
threshold wage w^, after properly calibrating f(w) (see below). This threshold leaves
the benets of those with wages below w^ una¤ected by the demographic shock. The
1throughout the appendix, the language "post-shock rule" will refer to any reform that changes the
benet earning rule. "Pre-shock rule" refers to the current US benet-earning rule.
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right hand side of (9) is an increasing function of w^. Therefore, the smaller is R^ the
smaller will be w^. A big shock would require a small w^. The fraction of the population
whose benets are una¤ected by the shock is
F (w^) 
Z w^
w 
f(w)dw. (10)
Option 14: Increasing Taxes to Protect a Larger Segment of the Pop-
ulation. Next, we consider the case where the Rawlsian policymaker wants to protect
benets among a greater segment of the population than is a¤orded without changing
the tax rate. That is, the policymaker wants to preserve the benet function beyond
the threshold wage w^ to a higher wage, say w. The fraction of the population whose
benets are una¤ected by the shock would then be F (w) =
R w
w  f(w)dw. Let the
mapping w(F ) be the inverse of F (w), where F 2 [0; 1], and w(1) = w+. Therefore,
conditional on a chosen value for F , the benet rule the policymaker wishes to impose
after the shock is a modied version of (7)
b(w) =
8>><>>:
b(wjR), for w 2 [w ; w(F )]
b(w(F )jR), for w 2 [w(F ); w+]
; (7)
which can be nanced with an appropriate increase in the tax rate. Replacing w^ with
w(F ) in (9) and solving gives the new tax rate that is needed to protect the benets
of the poorest F percent of the population
(F ) =
1
wR^
Z w(F )
w 
f(w)b(wjR)dw + 1
wR^
Z w+
w(F )
f(w)b(w(F )jR)dw: (11)
As expected, in (11) we see that the more severe the shock (i.e., the lower the
R^), the larger will be the required tax to protect the benets of the desired segment of
the population.
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For the special case where the policymaker wants to preserve the benets for
everyone, i.e., F = 1, then
(1) =
1
wR^
Z w+
w 
f(w)b(wjR)dw: (12)
Noting from (3) that the original tax before the shock, , can be expressed as
 =
1
wR
Z w+
w 
f(w)b(wjR)dw; (13)
we can write the new tax as a simple function of the old tax
(1) =
R
R^
: (14)
But for the more general case where F  1, the analysis is not as simple and we
must use (11) to numerically approximate (F ). We do this after calibrating the f(w)
density function.
Option 15: Protection of Benets to the Poor and Preserving the
Strict Earnings-Based Feature without a Tax Increase. We now suppose the
policymaker has two objectives. He would like to protect the benets of the poor but
he would also like to preserve the benet-earning link for all wage levels. While the
earnings-based feature of the current system is, at least in part, preserved in the above
analysis, it can be more explicitly maintained if we take a more narrow denition of
the poor.
Suppose the policymaker preserves the benet function up to some lower point,
say w0 < w^. This frees up extra tax revenue that allows the policymaker to preserve
the earnings-based feature of the program beyond the point w0, unlike the previous two
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sections in which the benet function became perfectly at after the critical threshold.
The fraction of the population whose benets are una¤ected by the shock would then be
F (w0) =
R w0
w  f(w)dw. Let w0(F ) be the inverse of F (w0) (and therefore the mappings
w(F ) and w0(F ) are the same, and we use the new notation just to stay organized).
We choose a new benet rule that operates like (7) and (7) before the threshold
and it continues to increase (like in (4)) after the threshold, though not at the same
rate as before the threshold. This is reasonable because it allows us to protect the
benets of the poor while at the same time preserving the positive benet-earning link
all across the wage domain of the benet-earning function. Conditional on a chosen
value for F , such that w0(F ) < w^, the new benet rule the policymaker imposes after
the shock is
b0(w) =
8>><>>:
b(wjR), for w 2 [w ; w0(F )]
b0(w
+)
 w
w+
0
, for w 2 [w0(F ); w+]
: (7)
The policymaker chooses F and therefore chooses the threshold w0(F ), and then the
parameters b0(w+) and 0 are simultaneously chosen to ensure (i) continuity of the
benet-earning function at the threshold w0(F ) and (ii) a balanced budget.
Continuity can be ensured by assuming the new benet function equals the
original function at the threshold w0(F )
b0(w
+)

w0(F )
w+
0
= b(w0(F )jR); (15)
which gives us the upperbound b0(w+) as a function of 0
b0(w
+) = b(w0(F )jR)

w0(F )
w+
 0
; (16)
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and in particular, b0(w+) is increasing in 0. The balanced budget equation becomes
 wR^ =
Z w0(F )
w 
f(w)b(wjR)dw +
Z w+
w0(F )
f(w)b0(w
+)
 w
w+
0
dw: (17)
To identify 0, we insert the continuity condition (16) into the balanced budget equation
(17) (in which everything but 0 is now given)
 wR^ =
Z w0(F )
w 
f(w)b(wjR)dw +
Z w+
w0(F )
f(w)b(w0(F )jR)

w
w0(F )
0
dw: (18)
At this level of generality, we cannot analytically solve (18) for 0, though we can
characterize how 0 must change when R^ or F change.
Because w=w0(F )  1 for all w 2 [w0(F ); w+]
@
@0
Z w+
w0(F )
f(w)b(w0(F )jR)

w
w0(F )
0
dw > 0: (19)
Therefore, the implicit derivative (from 18) @0=@R^ > 0. In words, the larger the
longevity shock (meaning the smaller the value for R^), the smaller the 0 will need to be
to balance the budget for a given F . This is intuitive because the second leg of the new
benet rule, after imposing the continuity condition, b0(w) = b(w0(F )jR) (w=w0(F ))0,
is increasing in 0 for all w 2 [w0(F ); w+] and strictly increasing for all w 2 (w0(F ); w+].
Also, if w0(F ) = w^, (18) is
 wR^ =
Z w^
w 
f(w)b(wjR)dw +
Z w+
w^
f(w)b(w^jR)
w
w^
0
dw: (20)
Insert (9) into (20) and simplifyZ w+
w^
f(w)b(w^jR)dw =
Z w+
w^
f(w)b(w^jR)
w
w^
0
dw; (21)
which holds only if 0 = 0, i.e., only if the benet rule becomes at after the threshold,
which is anticipated from the theoretical results above. For any other w0(F ) < w^, it
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must be the case that 0 > 0 in order to balance the budget since a value of 0 = 0
would necessarily leave a budget surplus. And, it must be the case that 0 <  because
the demographic shock leaves the policymaker unable to fund the original benet rule.
Hence, we know for the case of w0(F ) 2 (w ; w^), then 0 2 (0; ). We will dene 0(F )
to be that value of 0 that solves (18). Further, because b0(w) is strictly increasing in 0
for all w 2 (w0(F ); w+], the balanced budget constraint requires  00(F ) < 0: Thus, the
policymaker faces a fundamental tradeo¤ since higher F comes at the cost of a atter
benet-earning rule.
1.1 Calibrating the Theory to the US
We assume the survival function S(t) is calibrated to ensure that the ratio of
workers to retirees is 3.3, which is approximately the average value in the US during
the period 2000-2010, before pension tax revenues began to fall short of benets paid.
Although the ratio of workers to retirees has been falling since the inception of the
social security program, we think of the period 2000-2010 as the pre-shockperiod
because budget decits did not materialized until the end of this period.
Before exploring the consequences of the demographic shock, we need to calibrate
the model to match the US social security system. We set the social security tax
rate  to the full employer and employee tax of 12.4 percent (the Old-Age, Survivors,
and Disability Insurance (OASDI) tax rate since 1990). By including the disability
component of the tax (1.8 percent), we are better able to match the scale of the social
security benet rule in the US. This is not central to our analysis; we just need the
aggregate level of taxes collected to be su¢ cient to fund aggregate benets as they are
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constructed in the US.2 Benets are a piecewise linear function of earnings,
bUS(w) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
w1; for w  w1;
w11 + (w   w1)2; for w1  w  w2;
w11 + (w2   w1)2 + (w   w2)3; for w2  w  w3;
(22)
where w1, w2, and w3 are the bend points, and 1, 2, and 3 are the slopes of
the three distinct segments. Beyond the third point point, the function is at. We
use a conventional estimate of the bend points relative to average wages, w1 = 0:2 w,
w2 = 1:24 w, and w3 = 2:47 w (as in, e.g., Ortiz (2009)).3 The slopes are 1 = 90%,
2 = 32%, and 3 = 15%.
We use a exible, quasi-normal function (Caliendo and Findley (2010)) for the
wage density
f(w) = fmax exp
  (w   1)2 , where ;  2 R+. (23)
The thickness of this function is controlled by ; the mode is equal to  1, and the
extremum is fmax. We can ensure that f(w) is a proper density function for any choice
of  and  (with unit area under the curve,
R w+
w  f(w)dw = 1) by normalizing fmax
fmax =
"Z w+
w 
exp
  (w   1)2 dw# 1 : (24)
There are four parameters in the wage distribution that need to be calibrated:
w , w+, , and . We normalize w = 1. We set w  = 0 and w+ = 2:47 w because
2In reality some people pay taxes and receive either no benets or reduced benets. Examples are
those who work for less than ten years in the US and therefore get nothing back, and the working
spouse in a two-earner family gets a reduced benet. Both of these things help to explain why we
need a relatively big tax in our model to balance the budget, because in our model everyone who pays
taxes gets a full benet.
3When we estimate the bend points from 2011 relative to the national average wage index, as
reported by the SSA, we obtain bend points that are slightly di¤erent than those used by Ortiz and
others. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the discrepancy is not large enough to a¤ect our quantitative
results in a material way.
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social security benets and taxes are capped in the US at the third bend point, so
that any income beyond the cap is irrelevant to our analysis because no extra taxes
are paid and no extra benets are received for incremental increases in wages beyond
the third bend point.4 This leaves two unknowns:  and . The 2008 US Census
Bureau, Current Population Survey, is helpful in pinning down these parameters. We
use this data to construct a density function for household income and we nd that it is
bell shaped, skewed left, and the mode is about 74 percent of the mean. Hence, using
the assumption that the mean is one, we set  1 = 0:74: This leaves only , which
we choose to ensure that our assumption of w = 1 is indeed true. Doing this gives a
calibrated value of  = 0:338 and  = 1:351.5
Figure 5 is a graph of our wage density function (equation (23)). The density is
bell shaped and skewed left. The mode,  1 = 0:74, is indicated with a vertical dashed
line, as well as the mean wage, w = 1. The upperbound of the support is truncated at
the third bendpoint w3 = 2:47 w to reect the benet-earning cap.
Now that f(w) is calibrated, we can calibrate the parameter  so that the pre-
shock social security benet rule in the model (i.e., equation (6)) carefully ts the actual
social security rule (i.e., equation (22)). Let
 = argmin
"Z w+
w 
[b(wj; R)  bUS(w)]2 dw
#
; (25)
which gives  = 0:55: Our theoretical model provides an excellent t to the US benet-
4The 2008 U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey shows that households with income
more than 2.47 times the mean represent less than 8% of the total population.
5The density function f(w) from (23) collapses to the uniform density as ! 0, with mean equal
to the midpoint of the support. Alternatively, as  gets large, the density function becomes a spike at
the mode, and therefore the mean will equal the mode. As long as the mean that we are targeting lies
between the mode and the midpoint of the support, there will be a nite, positive  that will produce
the target mean.
69
earning rule and has the advantage of summarizing the degree of redistribution in a
single, elasticity parameter .
Figure 6 compares the piecewise di¤erentiable US benet rule, bUS(w) (equation
(22)), to our calibrated, single-parameter benet rule, b(wjR) (equation (6)). The graph
depicts the annuity value of social security benets as an increasing, concave function
of wage earnings. For convenience, we use the calibrated function as the pre-shock
baseline in our analysis. By design, the calibrated rule balances the budget.
After calibrating the model, we are able to study the implications of a Rawlsian
response to a demographic shock. We assume the survival function becomes more
rectangular so that the new ratio of workers to retirees R^ = 2:0, which corresponds to
the year 2070 according to the intermediate projections of the Trustees Report of the
Social Security Administration (SSA). The worst case projection of the SSA puts the
ratio of workers to retirees at 2.0 in the year 2030. In any case, we are interested in
understanding the Rawlsian response to a demographic shift of this magnitude.
1.2 Robustness: Alternative Wage Density Functions
We now consider two alternative density functions as a robustness check, one
with a mode of 0.54 and the other with a mode of 0.94. In each case we adjust
 to ensure the baseline mean of 1 is preserved. Figure 11 plots the two alternative
density functions together with the baseline function. We then recalibrate the elasticity
parameter  so that the social security benet rule in the model (i.e., equation (6))
continues to provide the best possible t to the actual social security rule (i.e., equation
(22)), via the optimization procedure in (25). For the case of the low mode (0.54), 
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does not change from its baseline value of 0.55. For the case of the high mode (0.94),
 now equals 0.57. Clearly, major adjustments to the benet-earning rule in the model
are unnecessary.
Next, we use the alternative density functions, together with the new best-
tting values of , to re-estimate the maximum number of poor individuals that can
be protected from the demographic shock without a tax increase. This corresponds
to F (w^) from Section 6, option 13. Recall, for the baseline wage density function, we
previously estimated F (w^) = 20%. Now, the low-mode alternative gives 22% and the
high-mode alternative gives 14%. Clearly, the policymaker in the model will have more
di¢ culty protecting the poor from the demographic shock if we have underestimated
the mode of the true distribution. But we would need to have seriously underestimated
it, and the census data clearly reports a mode that is signicantly lower than the mean.
If anything, we believe we have overestimated the mode: we took the baseline mode
to be 0.74 because this indeed corresponds to the most common earnings class in the
data, whereas a high-order polynomial t to the census data puts the mode close to
0.5. The discrepancy between the true mode and the mode from a polynomial t is
due to the noise in the density data, which appears to come from the fact that wage
salaries are often clustered around nice round numbers (or, at least people report their
salaries in round numbers). In any case, recalibrating to a lower mode only improves
the options available to the Rawlsian policymaker.
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Figure 1. The ratio of workers to retirees. This ratio is expected to fall from its current value of 
about 3.3 workers for each retiree, to about 2 workers for each retiree by 2030.  
Source: 2010 SSA Trustee Report. 
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Figure 2. Social security revenues and outlays. Social security revenues are expected to fall 
below outlays beginning in the year 2016. The trust fund will enable the SSA to pay fully 
scheduled benefits from 2016 until 2039. When the trust fund becomes depleted in 2039, the 
SSA will not be able to finance fully scheduled benefits. The thick dashed line shows social 
security revenues. The thin dashed line depicts scheduled benefits. The solid line depicts payable 
benefits. 
The vertical access is measured in percentage points of GDP. 
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Figure 3. Percentage of earnings and wage earners above the tax cap.This graph depicts the 
percentage of earnings above the social security tax cap, and the percentage of workers who earn 
wages above the cap. The percentage of workers who earn wages above the social security tax 
cap has remained constant around 6%. However, the percentage of wages above the cap has 
increase. This is possible because wages for the highest earners have grown more rapidly than 
average wages. Source: Irons' testimony before the Senate Aging Committee. 
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Figure 4. Option 11, lower initial benefits for the top 70 percent of earner, often called 
progressive price indexing. The graph depicts the new benefit-earning rule in the years 2040 and 
2080. By 2080, the rule flattens out for the top 70 percent of earners.  
AIME=Average indexed monthly income 
PIA (vertical axis)=initial benefit 
Source: CBO 
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Figure 5. Calibrated wage density function. The graph corresponds to equation (23) of the 
appendix. Source, Caliendo, Cottle (2011). 
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Figure 6. Benefit-earning rule. This graph depicts the current US benefit-earning rule, which is a 
piecewise linear function. The slope of the first segment is 90%, the slope of the second segment 
is 32%, the slope of the final segment is 15%. The smooth line is the baseline benefit-earning 
rule used in the model for reform options 12-15. It is also the baseline for all of the quantitative 
analysis in the appendix. Source: Caliendo, Cottle (2011). 
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Figure 7. Option 13: maximum protection of benefits to the poor without a tax increase. The 
post-shock benefit-earning rule protects benefits of the bottom 20% of the income distribution 
without a tax increase. Source: Caliendo, Cottle (2011). 
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Figure 8. Option 14: increasing taxes to protect a larger segment of the population. A 5 
percentage point increase in the social security tax allows the policymaker to protect the bottom 
50% of the wage distribution. Source: Caliendo, Cottle (2011). 
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Figure 9. Option 15: protection of benefits to the poor and preserving the earnings-based 
feature without a tax increase. As an example, the post-shock benefit-earning rule tracks the 
current (pre-shock) benefit-earning rule up to the first bend point (which is 20% of the mean 
wage). This protects the benefits of the bottom 9% of the population while preserving the 
positive slope of the benefit-earning rule without a tax increase. Source: Caliendo, Cottle (2011). 
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Figure 10. Option 15 continued: a potential future benefit-earning rule. This figure corresponds 
to the optimization procedure in equations(26)-(28). The new rule is a piecewise differentiable 
version of the rule in Figure 9, in which the original bend points are preserved and the budget is 
balanced under new demographics. The benefits of those below the first bend point are protected 
without an increase in taxes. Source: Caliendo, Cottle (2011). 
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Figure 11. Alternative Wage Density Functions. These wage density functions correspond to 
section 6.2. Each of these density functions preserves the mean of the US wage distribution. The 
mode deviates from the baseline but the thickness of the bell adjusts to preserve the mean at 1. 
